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Abstract
This paper studies spillovers across sovereign debt markets in the wake of
sovereign rating changes. To this end, we use an extensive dataset covering
all announcements by the three major agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s,
Fitch) and daily sovereign bond market movements of up to 73 developed and
emerging countries between 1994 and 2011. On the basis of an explicit coun-
terfactual and controlling for important dimensions of the announcement en-
vironment, we find asymmetric reactions to upgrades and downgrades. While
there is strong evidence of negative spillover effects in response to sovereign
downgrades, positive spillovers from upgrades are much more limited. Our
results also suggest that negative spillover effects are more pronounced for
countries within the same region. This does not appear to be due to (mea-
surable) fundamental linkages and similarities, such as trade, which turn out
to be strikingly insignificant.
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1 Introduction
Ever since tensions began to surface in the eurozone in late 2009, the announce-
ments by credit rating agencies (CRAs) on the creditworthiness of member states
have continuously made the headlines and rattled financial markets. In particular,
while not specific to the ongoing crisis, the notion that rating actions pertaining to
one country might have a major impact on the yields of other countries’ sovereign
bonds, too, has regained the attention of policymakers. In fact, concerns over so-
called negative spillover effects seem to be running deep, which is probably best
exemplified by reports that the European Commission was at one stage considering
a temporary restriction on the issuance of ratings under exceptional circumstances
(Financial Times, 2011). This begs two interesting, wider research questions. First,
when a rating announcement is made for a given country, do we generally observe
significant spillover effects on other countries’ bond markets? Second, if so, under
which conditions are those effects strongest, and which countries are affected most?
In this paper, we address these questions based on an extensive dataset comprising
both a complete history of sovereign rating actions by the “Big Three” (Standard &
Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) and daily sovereign bond market movements for up to 73
countries between 1994 and 2011. Not only do we cover both crisis and non-crisis pe-
riods and a broad set of developed and emerging countries across all continents. Our
dataset also contains sufficient variation to run an explicit counterfactual analysis
which pits small revisions in an agency’s assessment of a country’s creditworthiness
against all other changes. Moreover, it characterises along several important di-
mensions the environment in which a rating change is made. For instance, we are
crucially able to account for the fact that an announcement is often followed by a
similar one from a different agency soon after, which may influence the reception of
the later announcements.1
Our main findings can be summarised as follows. Whereas we find strong evi-
dence for the existence of significant cross-border spillover effects of sovereign rating
downgrades, reactions to upgrades appear to be, if anything, much more muted.
This points to an important asymmetry in the sovereign debt market’s treatment
of ratings. Regarding the influence of country characteristics, we find that negative
spillover effects tend to be more pronounced for countries within the same region,
1To the best of our knowledge, our investigation is the first to consider such interactions between
the major CRAs in identifying spillover effects.
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a finding that persists even after controlling for measurable fundamental links and
similarities between countries, which are strikingly insignificant.
Our paper is related to a broad strand of literature that investigates the effects of
sovereign rating announcements on different segments of the financial markets. The
most common exercise is to conduct an event study gauging the direct impact of
rating changes on the bonds issued by the country concerned. However, there is
also a substantial body of research analysing the reaction of the country’s stock
and, more recently, of its CDS market. As a general result, this literature finds a
strong and significant impact of sovereign rating downgrades, while upgrades have
an insignificant or more limited impact (see, eg, Cantor and Packer, 1996; Larra´ın
et al., 1997; Reisen and von Maltzan, 1999; Brooks et al., 2004; Hooper et al., 2008;
Hill and Faff, 2010).
Moreover, in recent years a growing body of research has specifically studied whether
sovereign rating changes also lead to spillover effects on other countries’ sovereign
bonds. Generally speaking, the literature affirms the existence of such spillovers,
meaning that a rating action on one country is found to significantly affect the
sovereign bond prices of other countries (eg, Arezki et al., 2011; De Santis, 2012;
Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010). Some studies also point out that spillovers are not
limited to sovereign debt markets but that rating changes also affect foreign stock
and exchange markets (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002; Arezki et al., 2011; Alsakka
and ap Gwilym, 2012). Regarding a potential asymmetry in the spillover effects of
negative and positive rating events, the results of the literature so far remain incon-
clusive. Whereas Afonso et al. (2011) find spillovers to matter most for downgrades,
with little or no effects of sovereign upgrades, Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) find
positive rating events to have a greater spillover effect on foreign CDS prices than
negative ones.
Most of these studies focus either on spillover effects during specific regional crisis
episodes (see Afonso et al. (2011), Arezki et al. (2011) and De Santis (2012) for the
eurozone crisis; Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) for the 1997/98 Asian crisis) or
on an otherwise homogeneous sample of countries only, such as emerging countries
(Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010; Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002). This leaves open
the question to what extent their findings are specific to the episode analysed.
The study most closely related to our work is Gande and Parsley (2005). Based
on a sample of 34 developed and emerging economies from 1991 to 2000, they find
evidence for the existence of spillover effects. In line with Afonso et al. (2011),
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they report asymmetries in the effects of upgrades and downgrades, with the lat-
ter triggering large and significant spillovers but no discernible impact of upgrades.
Analysing the transmission mechanisms of these spillovers, they find trade and fi-
nancial linkages to be the most relevant, and physical proximity and cultural or
institutional linkages to be of little importance.
Our study differs from theirs in several ways. Firstly, it is based on a larger and more
up-to-date sample of up to 73 countries for the 1994–2011 period. Secondly, their
dataset only includes information of ratings by Standard & Poor’s (S&P), which
risks biasing estimation results since, as we demonstrate, a rating action by one
agency is often foreshadowed or closely followed by a similar action from another
rating agency. Ignoring the informational content of rating actions by other agencies
may therefore prove to be problematic. Thirdly, their identification of spillovers uses
a “comprehensive credit rating”, which combines actual rating changes and credit
watch, or review, changes into a single 17-notch scale. Hence, they make additional
assumptions on the relative informational content of reviews and ratings. In this
study, we exploit the variation in our sample to focus solely on the class of actual
rating changes and their relative strength as the only observable difference between
them. At the same time, we do allow for differences in the informational content of
sovereign upgrades and downgrades by controlling for watchlistings that may build
anticipation by foreshadowing actual future rating changes. Finally, due to lack of
data, Gande and Parsley (2005) only use an indirect measure of trade integration.
Relying on bilateral data, we find trade to be remarkably unrelated to the strength
of spillovers.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we describe the dataset
and highlight some important characteristics of rating announcements. Section 3
discusses the estimation strategy for identifying cross-border spillovers. Section 4
presents our empirical results and discusses their interpretation. We end with a brief
conclusion.
2 Data
2.1 The dataset
For our study, we compile a broad dataset of the yields of publicly traded sovereign
bonds at daily frequency. The dataset starts in January 1994 and ends in December
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Figure 1: Number of sovereign bonds in dataset
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Notes — This figure shows the scope and composition, by economic development, of the sovereign bond sample
between 1994 and 2011, highlighting a notable increase in the coverage of emerging economies over time. Countries
are classified according to the IMF World Economic Outlook.
2011. Since for many countries data are only available after 1994, we add those coun-
tries’ sovereign bonds as soon as reliable information becomes available. Whereas
our dataset only comprises sovereign bonds issued by 27 countries in 1994, this num-
ber increases to 74 countries towards the end of our sample period. This reflects
both the increased financing needs of sovereigns and the growing prevalence of bond
issuance, as opposed to bank financing, during the last 20 years. While for 1994
sovereign bond yields are mostly available for developed countries, the availability of
emerging market bond yields picks up heavily over our sample period. Towards the
end of the period, emerging markets even account for the bulk of sovereign bonds
in the sample. Figure 1 illustrates the increasing scope of our dataset over time.
In order to consider a broad spectrum of sovereign bonds, our sample draws on
data from different sources. Our preferred data source is Bloomberg, from which
we use generic 10-year yields for up to 33 countries. If data are not available on
Bloomberg, we supplement them with yields from Datastream’s 10-year Government
Bond Benchmark Index, ensuring that this does not induce structural breaks in the
series. Since sovereign bond availability for emerging markets is quite limited both
on Bloomberg and on Datastream, we also use data from the JP Morgan Emerging
Markets Bond Index Global (henceforth EMBI Global, see JP Morgan, 1999). While
bonds included in the EMBI Global have to fulfil strict requirements regarding the
availability of reliable daily prices, the average maturity of a country’s bond index
can vary remarkably from that of the other two sources. We therefore control for
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Figure 2: Number of rated countries
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Notes — This figure shows the scope and composition, by economic development, of the sample of countries rated
by at least one of the major rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch) between 1994 and 2011, with a notable increase
in the coverage of emerging economies over time. Countries are classified according to the IMF World Economic
Outlook.
maturity in all regressions. Table A.1 in the Appendix gives a detailed overview of
the sovereign bond market data included in our sample.
For the purpose of our later analysis, we compute sovereign bond spreads. The
spread is the differential of the country’s sovereign bond yield over that of a US
Treasury bond of comparable maturity. We use 10-year maturities where possible,
which is the case for the developed economies and some emerging markets. For the
other emerging economies, we rely on the EMBI Global data. As those correspond
to different maturities (depending on the average maturity of eligible instruments
a country has issued), we obtain the relevant US Treasury yields by interpolating
from the closest published yield curve rates.
Information on sovereign ratings comes from the rating agencies’ websites and in-
cludes daily information both on rating changes and on sovereign watchlistings by
any of the “Big Three” (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch) from 1994 to 2011. We choose the
year 1994 as a natural starting point for our sample period since Fitch only started
to assign sovereign ratings in that year. Like the number of publicly traded sovereign
bonds, the scope and composition of countries rated by the “Big Three” changes
quite substantially during our sample period. While in 1994 only 34 sovereigns were
rated by at least one of the agencies, this number increased to 98 countries in 2011
(see Figure 2).
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Figure 3: Rating actions over time
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Notes — This figure shows upgrades and downgrades of developed and emerging economies made by S&P, Moody’s
and Fitch between 1994 and 2011. Countries are classified according to the IMF World Economic Outlook.
2.2 Characteristics of rating announcements
Over the whole sample period, we are able to consider a total of 1,097 rating changes,
of which 635 were upgrades and 462 downgrades. In general, one can observe a
significant increase in the number of sovereign credit ratings during our sample
period, particularly in emerging market countries.
As Figure 3 illustrates, rating activity is not evenly distributed over time but, es-
pecially for downgrades, shows some hefty peaks during specific episodes of crisis.
Whereas in “normal times”, downgrades tend to be relatively scarce, a severe in-
crease can be observed in the context of the 1997/98 Asian crisis (affecting mostly
emerging countries plus South Korea and Hong Kong) and following the 2008–2011
financial and European debt crises (where for the first time advanced economies
have been exposed to downgrades at a large scale). This means that similar an-
nouncements tend to cluster around certain time periods.
In addition, it is an important stylised fact that the downgrading of a country is
frequently followed by yet another downgrade announcement for that same coun-
try soon after. This is all the more probable because there is a strong overlap in
country coverage by the “Big Three”. Almost all countries in our sample are rated
by more than one agency only and most are even rated by all three (70 out of 98
countries at the end of 2011). Hence, in what we term within-clustering, different
agencies may make the same announcement for a given country in short succession
or even on the same day. Figure 4 illustrates this issue by plotting the cumulative
distribution function and summary statistics of the number of days between simi-
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Figure 4: Clustering of rating announcements
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Notes — This figure shows the cumulative distribution functions and summary statistics of the number of calendar
days between an upgrade (downgrade) announcement for a given country and a subsequent upgrade (downgrade) of
the same country by any agency. Information is based on the sample of 1,097 rating announcements (635 upgrades,
462 downgrades) made by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch between 1994 and 2011.
lar rating actions on the same country. As can be seen, clustering is particularly
pronounced for downgrades. In around five per cent of all cases, a downgrade on a
country is followed by another downgrade on that country within just one day. For
example, in the course of the Asian crisis, S&P, Fitch and Moody’s all downgraded
South Korea’s credit rating on successive days between 25 and 27 November 1997.
Similarly, during the ongoing European debt crisis, Fitch issued a downgrade for
Greece on 8 December 2009. One week later, S&P downgraded the country as well,
as did Moody’s yet another six days later.
The presence of clustering might be of crucial importance when examining the
spillover effects from a rating announcement since its informational content is likely
to vary depending on whether it has been announced in isolation or just a few days
after (or even on the same day as) a similar announcement by another agency. Not
to control for these cases could seriously bias estimation results for the impart of
rating announcements on sovereign bond markets.
Clustering across countries may matter, too. When CRAs change the rating of a
number of different countries in the same direction simultaneously, one needs to
control for the fact that some countries will then be both “non-event” and event
countries. Otherwise, one might erroneously detect spillovers across sovereign bond
markets when, in fact, one is looking at a spillover in ratings. This is all the more
important if the countries concerned share a common trait of some form which leads
CRAs to make simultaneous announcements for the countries concerned in the first
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place, as appears to have happened on 3 October 2008 when Fitch downgraded
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.2 Is is therefore a major advantage of our dataset
that it enables us to explicitly take into account prior and parallel rating actions
by other CRAs and on other countries. This should provide for a particularly clean
identification of relevant effects, which compares favourably with Gande and Parsley
(2005) and other work in the sovereign spillovers literature (eg, Christopher et al.,
2012; Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010).
Similarly, the informational content of a rating change might be conditional on
whether it has been preceded by the respective country being put on a watch-
list. As the literature on the effects of rating announcements on the refinancing
conditions of the very same country shows (eg, Afonso et al., 2011; Ismailescu and
Kazemi, 2010), rating changes are often preceded by a similar change in the market’s
assessment of sovereign risk, especially when countries have been put “on watch”,
or “review”, before.3 Ignoring these anticipation effects risks underestimating bond
market reactions to a sovereign rating action. Since our dataset includes all sovereign
watchlistings by the “Big Three”, we can directly control for a country’s watchlist
status and mitigate potential problems with anticipation.
3 Identifying sovereign spillovers
3.1 Counterfactual choice and estimation strategy
The existence of rating spillover effects in the sovereign debt market requires, by
definition, that the announcement by a CRA on the creditworthiness of one country
(event country) impacts significantly on the bond yields of another (non-event coun-
try). Yet, the mere observation of a change in non-event country yields when an
event-country announcement is made does not suffice to establish a causal relation
because non-event country yields might have changed regardless. Hence, the key
issue in identifying potential spillover effects is to find a suitable counterfactual.
We cannot apply the procedure traditionally used in event studies on direct an-
nouncement effects, however. This strand of literature focuses on, for instance, the
2Other examples may be seen in S&P’s downgrade announcements for South Korea and Taiwan
during the Asian crisis on 24 October 1997, or in Fitch lowering the ratings of Estonia, Ireland,
Latvia and Lithuania on 8 April 2009.
3In the following, we use the two terms interchangeably. While S&P and Fitch issue watchlist-
ings, in the Moody’s terminology those are called “reviews”.
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bond yield response of a sovereign that has been downgraded. In this framework,
effects are identified by the existence of abnormal returns, meaning that around the
announcement (event window), returns are significantly different from normal, as
estimated over a longer time frame before the announcement (estimation window).
In order to be a reasonable guide to normal returns, the estimation window has to
be chosen such that other events with a potentially significant impact on returns are
excluded (see, eg, MacKinlay, 1997). In other words, the counterfactual for gauging
the impact of rating announcements is “no rating change”. While this represents a
challenge in direct announcement studies already, which focus on countries in isola-
tion, the identification of spillover effects based on this counterfactual is essentially
impossible.
The reason is that, in a spillover context, we would require that there are no an-
nouncements on any rated country within the estimation window.4 There is obvi-
ously a trade-off between the length of that window and the number of announce-
ments eligible for inclusion in the estimation. However, even at a 30-day length
commonly used in sovereign event studies, which is towards the shorter end of the
event-study literature more generally, only 23 upgrades would be eligible, and 36
downgrades.
We therefore pursue an identification strategy that does not rely on “no rating
change at all” as its counterfactual, but which discriminates between rating changes
according to their severity. More precisely, rating changes of a single notch serve as
the counterfactual for more severe changes of two notches or more.5 This approach
is implemented in the following estimation equation, which we run on upgrades and
downgrades separately:6
∆Spreadn,t = α + β · LARGEe,t +RatEnve,n,t · γ +Othere,n,t · δ + ωe,n,t .
4The universe of all rated countries is the relevant benchmark when analysing potential spillover
effects in this framework. Of course, if we only required the estimation window to be free of
announcements pertaining to the non-event country, the number of events eligible for inclusion
would increase substantially. However, this would amount to assuming from the outset that only
direct effects, as opposed to spillover effects, could possibly matter, which would defy the purpose
of the investigation.
5See Table A.2 in the Appendix on the mapping of CRAs’ letter ratings into a linear 17-notch
scale.
6This is in keeping with the methodology employed by the bulk of the spillover and event-study
literature. The asymmetries in reactions to positive and negative announcements consistently
found therein further reinforce the notion of treating upgrades and downgrades distinctly.
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Figure 5: Distribution of rating changes
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Notes — This figure shows the distribution of the severity of rating changes, measured on a 17-notch scale (see
Table A.2 in the Appendix). Numbers are based on the sample of 1,097 rating announcements (635 upgrades, 462
downgrades) made by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch between 1994 and 2011.
The dependent variable ∆Spreadn,t is the change in non-event country n’s bond
spread vis-a`-vis the United States over the two-trading-day window [−1,+1] around
the announcement on day 0 of a change in the rating of event country e (6= n).
The event window length accounts for the fact that by the time a CRA announces
a rating change on day 0, markets in some parts of the world may have already
closed. Hence, any impact on those would not materialise before day +1, and would
go undetected using a shorter [−1, 0] window. The same argument applies to rating
announcements made after the exchange has closed in the country concerned, which
we cannot distinguish from those made during trading.7
The key regressor in identifying possible spillover effects is LARGEe,t, a dummy that
takes on a value of one if e’s rating is changed by two notches or more, and zero
otherwise. We thereby treat rating changes of two notches or more as one single
group. This is due to the distribution of the severity of upgrades and downgrades
in our sample, which is shown in Figure 5.
The vast majority of rating announcements result in a one-notch change in a coun-
try’s rating. Beyond that, we observe a significant amount of events only for changes
of two notches, while changes of three notches or more occur only very rarely. There-
7CRAs have made post-trading announcements during the eurozone crisis, for instance (Finan-
cial Times, 2010; Wall Street Journal, 2012). In financial markets more generally, information
which is deemed highly relevant is frequently released when exchanges are closed in order to limit
or smooth the impact on prices.
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fore, we do not include separate dummy variables for the latter categories but group
all rating changes of two notches or more into a single bin.8
In this framework, positive (negative) spillover effects are equivalent to a drop (rise)
in the spreads of country n which is significantly more pronounced in response to
a two-or-more-notches upgrade (downgrade) of country e than to a single-notch
one. We would then expect β to be significantly negative (positive) in the upgrade
(downgrade) regressions.
This counterfactual choice also has implications for the estimation technique. Since
we do not use “no change” as the counterfactual (due to the estimation window
problem outlined above), we identify spillover effects in pooled cross sections of
upgrades and downgrades rather than in a true panel setup.9 We estimate the
model by OLS.
At this point, it seems important to address a concern about potential endogeneity
of the large-change dummy. The implicit assumption in the above design is that the
rating announcement constitutes the dominant event in the event window, and that
its severity is not systematically related to other spread-relevant information being
released simultaneously. Otherwise, LARGE and the error term ω would be corre-
lated, so that β would be biased. Restricting the event window to two days already
goes a long way towards alleviating the problem by limiting the amount of informa-
tion that might potentially correlate with the large-change dummy. However, there
might still remain a concern if, for instance, CRAs downgraded a country instanta-
neously in reaction to “bad news” and did so by more notches for “particularly bad
news”.
While one cannot rule this out for every single announcement in the sample —
and because soft information is notoriously hard to measure —, the proclaimed
practice and a corresponding body of empirical literature suggest that such a bias
might not be a major issue. The agencies state a preference for stable ratings
(see, eg, Cantor, 2001; Cantor and Mann, 2003, 2007; Standard & Poor’s, 2010),
intending to announce a change only if it is unlikely to be reversed in the near
future. This “through the cycle” approach contrasts with a “point in time” approach
in that cyclical phenomena should not, in themselves, trigger rating changes. If
CRAs actually pursued a stable rating policy, the fact that cyclical and permanent
8For the same reason, Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) also apply this grouping in their analysis
of the direct effect of sovereign rating changes on exchange rate movements.
9Thus, t denotes generic rather than actual time and can be thought of as indexing the different
rating events.
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factors are difficult to disentangle (International Monetary Fund, 2010) should imply
some delay between new information becoming available and an ensuing change in
the credit rating. Empirical evidence for corporate bond rating indicates that this
practice might indeed be followed, thus reducing the timeliness of rating changes
(Altman and Rijken, 2004; Liu et al., 2011), and that the CRAs may be “slow” in
processing new information (Lo¨ﬄer, 2005). This perception has also been expressed
in investor surveys (Association for Financial Professionals, 2002; Baker and Mansi,
2002). Finally, Sy (2004) notes for the sovereign sector that it may simply be
concerns about rating changes precipitating significant increases in borrowing costs
or outright crises which make CRAs opt for somewhat less timely announcements.
3.2 The rating environment
The rating environment may play an important role for the bond market reaction
to an upgrade or downgrade announcement. Our regressions therefore control for
a number of different rating variables contained in RatEnve,n,t. For example, the
spillover potential of a rating action might depend on the creditworthiness of the
event country, which we proxy by the rating it held with the announcing CRA
on the day before (InitRate,t). We also include the absolute difference between
the event country’s initial rating and that of the non-event country (∆InitRate,n,t).
This is because one might expect bilateral effects to differ depending on how similar
countries are in terms of creditworthiness.
In addition, it is well established in the literature that the impact of rating announce-
ments may vary according to whether they have been anticipated by the market (eg,
Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010; Gande and Parsley, 2005; Reisen and von Maltzan,
1999). One potentially important and convenient measure of such anticipation is
whether the actual rating action has been foreshadowed by a CRA putting the re-
spective country on watch, or review (Afonso et al., 2011; Kaminsky and Schmukler,
2002; Hand et al., 1992). Hence, we add a dummy that takes on a value of one if
a review in the indicated direction has been ongoing at the time of the upgrade or
downgrade, and zero otherwise (OnWatche,t).
Introducing an explicit control variable differs from Gande and Parsley (2005), who
amalgamate a country’s watch status into a “comprehensive credit rating”. More
precisely, for any given day their measure is defined as the country’s actual letter
rating on a 17-notch scale, raised (lowered) if the country is on review for an upgrade
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(downgrade). Presumably due to the counterfactual issue discussed in 3.1, Gande
and Parsley (2005) then focus on those days as events on which there is a non-zero
change in the comprehensive credit rating. However, this identification crucially
involves additional assumptions on how changes in review status and actual rating
changes relate to one another quantitatively. Furthermore, one might argue that,
despite the potential anticipation effects of watchlistings, the latter are not qual-
itatively the same as actual rating changes. In any case, our much larger sample
allows us to avoid those assumptions. We focus instead on the class of actual rating
changes and their relative strengths only while controlling for anticipation through
watchlistings. This should provide for a cleaner identification of spillover effects.
Moreover, we have shown in 2.2 that similar announcements by different CRAs
tend to cluster around certain dates, and that this is particularly true for rat-
ing downgrades. We account for potential clustering within countries by a vari-
able which captures the number of similar announcements made for a particu-
lar country by other agencies over a 14-day window before the respective event
(SimActsWdwEvte,t). For clustering across countries, ie one or more CRAs chang-
ing the rating of more than one country in the same direction simultaneously, we
include the number of similar announcements made on the same day for the“non-
event” country (SimActsDayNonEvte,t).
Finally, we add the volatility measure for the S&P 500 Index in the United States
(VIXt) to control for the “global market sentiment” in which the rating announce-
ment is made. One might, for instance, imagine that in more turbulent times (ie, in
which volatility is high) borrowing conditions deteriorate across the board, so that
spreads over the event window would be more likely to increase in any case. In that
sense, VIXt can be regarded as a technical control, which also adds a genuine time
component to the pooled cross sections.
All regressions include the vector Othere,n,t which contains a fixed set of controls,
such as event and non-event country dummies. Importantly, we also account for
common time effects in the pooled cross sections through the inclusion of year dum-
mies. These capture global macroeconomic trends which might be reflected in the
yields of US Treasuries and, hence, spread changes. For instance, there may be a
stronger tendency for investments to flow into the US in some years due to a (per-
ceived) “safe haven” status, or a “global savings glut” that has been discussed for
the early 2000s. Moreover, each regression includes the following technical controls:
the maturity of non-event country bonds in levels and squares to account for po-
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sitions on the yield curve, a dummy for EMBI Global bond yields, and a dummy
for spread changes that need to be measured over weekends as those correspond to
longer intervals in terms of calendar days.
4 Results
4.1 Existence of cross-border spillover effects
Table 1 shows baseline estimation results on the existence of cross-border effects for
upgrades and downgrades, respectively. We start with a parsimonious specification
in Model 1, which only contains our main variable of interest, the large-change
dummy LARGE and initial ratings. We then control for potential anticipation
effects from watchlistings as well as clustering within and across countries in Model
2. Finally, Model 3 also accounts for global market turbulence, or risk aversion.
The key result is that the large-change dummy has the expected sign for both up-
grades (ie, negative) and downgrades (ie, positive), and that it is highly significant
in both cases. Moreover, this finding appears to be remarkably robust as the co-
efficient on LARGE is very stable and retains its significance across specifications.
Comparison of the absolute coefficients, however, indicates an asymmetry in the
spillover effects induced by upgrades and downgrades, respectively. Downgrades of
two notches or more are associated with an average spread change over the event
window which exceeds that of one-notch downgrades by about 2 basis points. In
contrast, large upgrades are associated with spread changes that are roughly 1.2 ba-
sis points below those of one-notch upgrades. The asymmetry is also reflected in the
lower significance levels for upgrades despite a larger number of rating events and
observations. To further corroborate this, we confirm in a separate (unreported) re-
gression that the absolute coefficients for upgrades and downgrades are statistically
different from each other.10
Asymmetries in the reactions to positive and negative events have frequently been
documented in the literature. For instance, Gande and Parsley (2005) find for a
10To this end, we pool all rating changes and replace the event-window spread changes for
upgrades with their negative values for the sake of comparison. We then add a downgrade dummy
(taking on a value of one for downgrades, and zero for upgrades) to all specifications both in levels
and as interactions with the other explanatory variables. The interaction term of LARGE with the
downgrade dummy is positive and highly significant throughout, pointing to statistically significant
differences in the absolute coefficients for upgrades and downgrades.
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1990s sample of developed and emerging countries that negative rating events in
one country affect sovereign bond spreads in others whereas there is no discernible
impact for positive events. Similar results have been obtained regarding the direct
effects in sovereign bond and CDS markets (Afonso et al., 2011; Larra´ın et al.,
1997), mirroring a well-established finding from event studies on bond, stock, and
CDS returns in the corporate sector (eg, Norden and Weber, 2004; Steiner and
Heinke, 2001; Goh and Ederington, 1993; Hand et al., 1992). Recently, however,
there has also been evidence of symmetric spillover reactions to sovereign rating
announcements in the foreign exchange market (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012), or
even that positive announcements in emerging countries have both stronger direct
and spillover effects in sovereign CDS markets (Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010).
Turning to the rating-environment controls, neither the initial rating of the event
country just before the rating announcement nor the difference in initial ratings be-
tween event and non-event country seem to play a role in terms of spillover effects.
Both coefficients are far from significant across specifications. Previous evidence on
this has been inconclusive. While Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) and Ferreira and
Gama (2007) detect stronger spillover effects in the foreign exchange and stock mar-
kets, respectively, for event countries with lower initial ratings, Gande and Parsley
(2005) find the opposite for bond market reactions (to sovereign downgrades).
We do find some evidence, though, that the impact of an actual rating change on
spreads depends on whether it has been foreshadowed by a watchlisting. The cor-
responding dummy, OnWatch, is signed as expected for both upgrades and down-
grades, yet there is again an asymmetry: the control variable turns out insignifi-
cant in all upgrade specifications but significant at almost the five per cent level
for downgrades (Model 2 in Panel B). A possible explanation for this is given by
Altman and Rijken (2006). They point out that watchlistings partially ease the
tension between the market’s expectation of rating stability and the demand for
rating timeliness. This suggests that watchlistings contribute to the anticipation
of actual rating changes. Given that investors tend to be more concerned about
negative news, watchlistings should be more important in building anticipation for
downgrades than for upgrades. Figures from our dataset support this notion. While
about a third of all downgrades are preceded by a watchlisting, so are only 15 per
cent of all upgrades. Finally, it has often been noted that there is an incentive to
leak good news (eg, Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012; Christopher et al., 2012; Gande
and Parsley, 2005; Goh and Ederington, 1993; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986), so
16
the relevance of watchlistings in building anticipation is conceivably much lower in
the case of upgrades. We interpret the fact that our results are consistent with this
literature as reassuring in terms of the validity of the regression specifications.
Our results also point to the importance of the clustering of rating announce-
ments, especially for downgrades. While the controls for both clustering within
(SimActsWdwEvt) and across countries (SimActsDayNonEvt) are highly significant
in the downgrade regressions, the effect of across-clustering is only marginally signifi-
cant once for upgrades. This appears plausible in light of the stylised facts presented
in 2.2 because simultaneous announcements on several countries by one or more
agencies occur much less frequently for upgrades than for downgrades. Moreover,
the coefficients are correctly signed for both upgrades and downgrades, suggesting
that the spread-decreasing (spread-increasing) spillover effects of an upgrade (down-
grade) are all the more pronounced when one or more upgrades (downgrades) are
announced for the “non-event” country at the same time.
A similar statement regarding the signs cannot be made with the same degree of con-
fidence for SimActsWdwEvt, which measures the number of upgrades (downgrades)
announced by other agencies over a 14-day window before the respective upgrade
(downgrade).11 While we again find strong differences in significance between up-
grades and downgrades as well as opposing signs, one need not necessarily expect
within-clustering to have an additional spread-increasing effect over the event win-
dow for downgrades. Instead, the variable might subsume two opposing effects. On
the one hand, the clustering of downgrades over a short interval could imply that
any announcement is less relevant individually. In that case, one would expect a
negative coefficient. On the other hand, clustering is much more prevalent in cri-
sis times (see 2.2). Thus, SimActsWdwEvt tends to be higher in times of market
turbulence or global risk aversion when spreads against a “safe-haven” investment
like US Treasuries are upward-trending, too (eg, Gonza´lez-Rozada and Levy Yeyati,
2008; Garc´ıa-Herrero and Ort´ız, 2006; International Monetary Fund, 2004, 2006).
11In choosing the window length, we follow Gande and Parsley (2005) who employ a two-week
duration for a comparable control variable. However, using a one-week or three-week window
instead does not alter the conclusions. Moreover, the reader may note that we do not report a
variable capturing similar rating announcements made on the same day by other agencies. This is
due to the unattractive property that this variable drops out in the upgrade regressions since there
is not a single event of multiple upgrades of a country on the same day in our sample. Therefore,
in the interest of comparability, we choose not to report downgrade regressions with that control
either. These regressions show, however, that the measure is always insignificant for downgrades,
regardless of whether it is included in addition to, or as a stand-in for, SimActsWdwEvt. All results
are available on request.
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As this is consistent with a positive sign, the significantly positive coefficients for
downgrades suggest that we may be picking up a substantial turbulence component.
Since the literature provides little guidance on whether this is what is driving our
results, we include the S&P 500 Volatility Index (VIX ), a commonly used proxy for
global risk aversion (De Santis, 2012). As expected, its coefficient is positive and
significant for both upgrades and downgrades, given the relation between market
turbulence and yield spread drift. Interestingly, the coefficient on SimActsWdwEvt
is still positive but slightly lower than before. This may be due to VIX picking
up some of the turbulence effect previously captured by SimActsWdwEvt. Hence,
there is indeed evidence that clustering may also reduce the spillover relevance of
individual rating events that take place in a period of many similar announcements
by other CRAs.
Finally, we subject our baseline regressions for downgrades to some robustness checks
regarding extreme rating events and two specific crisis episodes. One might be con-
cerned, for instance, that grouping all downgrades of two notches or more into a
single bin could obscure the impact of a very few severe rating changes that might
be driving our results (see Figure 5). However, this is not the case as dropping down-
grades of four notches or more and three notches or more, respectively, leaves the
findings unchanged. Furthermore, we ensure that the results on negative spillovers
are not merely the product of the eurozone and Asian crises. These robustness
checks are reported in Table A.4 in the Appendix.
4.2 Spillover channels
We now turn to potential channels of spillover effects in the sovereign bond market.
While the regressions presented so far control for a multiplicity of factors pertaining
to event and non-event countries on their own, they do not — with the exception
of ∆InitRat — account for bilateral characteristics of event and non-event coun-
tries. However, bond market reactions in the wake of rating announcements in
other countries might differ depending on similarities and bilateral linkages, which
may be highly relevant from the perspective of policymakers.
We therefore augment our final baseline specification (Model 3 in Table 1) by
whether the event and non-event country belong to the same geographical region
(Region), whether they are members of a common major trade bloc (TradeBloc), and
the importance of the event country as an export destination for the non-event coun-
18
try (ExpImpEvt). We also consider the size of the event country’s GDP (SizeEvt) as
well as differences between event and non-event countries in terms of GDP (∆Size)
and trend growth (∆TrendGrowth). Definitions and sources for all control variables
are reported in Table A.3 in the Appendix. The results are shown in Tables 2 and
3.
There is again a notable asymmetry between the findings on upgrades and those on
downgrades. This applies to both the results on the potential channels themselves
and to the impact that the inclusion of additional controls has on the robustness
of our baseline findings. Whereas the results for downgrades are highly stable and
intuitive, they paint a more nuanced picture for upgrades.
In more detail, we find consistently that spillover effects are significantly stronger
with the same region in the case of downgrade announcements. The coefficient on
Region has the correct sign, indicating that borrowing costs increase by up to almost
four basis points more for non-event countries in the same region as the event coun-
try than for those outside it. Our findings appear plausible since countries in the
same geographical region are more likely to share institutional or cultural character-
istics and to have important real and financial links to one another. Apart from the
fundamental factors, a more mundane explanation might posit that financial mar-
kets simply find non-event countries from the same region “guilty by association”.
The results are also in line with a number of studies which focus on one or more par-
ticular regions from the start (eg, Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012; Arezki et al., 2011;
De Santis, 2012). Surprisingly, we obtain positive coefficients for upgrades as well,
which would suggest that those are less likely to induce spillovers within than across
regions. While one could imagine that belonging to a particular region does not
matter for upgrade announcements due to an asymmetric perception by investors,
the fact that the coefficients are often significant is not easily rationalised. On a
positive note, though, the magnitude for upgrades is only about a third of that
for downgrades. Therefore, in the interest of comparability and as an important
economic control, we retain Region in all specifications.
The two trade controls, ie common membership in a major trade bloc (TradeBloc)
and the non-event country’s ratio of exports to the event country to domestic GDP
(ExpImpEvt), are signed as expected throughout, pointing to more pronounced
spillover effects for both upgrades and downgrades when such linkages exist, or
when they are stronger. However, they are only mildly significant once for upgrades
(see Model 7 in Table 2). Moreover, the stability in magnitude and significance of
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Region upon inclusion of the trade variables, in particular for downgrades, seems to
indicate that stronger spillover effects within regions cannot easily be explained by
real linkages.12 To the extent that trade also captures a notable portion of variation
in bilateral asset holdings, the same applies to financial linkages.13 Hence, it appears
more likely that our findings on belonging to the same region are driven by shared
institutional and cultural features or, less sophisticated, that this has an effect by
itself.
The evidence on the remaining potential channels is succinctly summarised for down-
grades. In no specification do the size of the event country’s GDP (SizeEvt), its in-
crement over that of the non-event country (∆Size), or differences in trend growth
between event and non-event countries (∆TrendGrowth) turn out to be significant
determinants of the strength of bond market spillovers. At the same time, all results
from the baseline and augmented baseline regressions (Models 1 and 2 in Table 3)
prove remarkably stable in terms of both magnitude and significance.
This contrasts with the corresponding findings for upgrades. On the one hand,
we obtain a number of interesting results for the size and growth controls. On the
other hand, the augmented regressions raise some doubts on our our main variable of
interest, LARGE, in terms of statistical significance. The latter alternates between
specifications and vanishes in some, yet in view of the considerably stronger baseline
results for downgrades, this is not entirely surprising. It merely serves to underscore
the asymmetry that exists between positive and negative rating changes. However,
this also means that the evidence on the potential channels for upgrades should be
taken with a grain of salt.
12The fact that the correlation of the two trade variables with the region control is low does not
support multicollinearity as a technical explanation for this result. Moreover, replacing ExpIm-
pEvt by other proxies for bilateral trade does not change the picture either (see Table A.5 in the
Appendix).
13We would like to control directly for financial linkages of event and non-event countries, eg the
exposure of non-event country banks to event-country sovereign bonds. Unfortunately, even use
of the most comprehensive data from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey leads
to a massive reduction in the number of observations and major selection effects along the time
series and country dimensions, which renders virtually impossible any comparison with the baseline
results. This also applies to data on foreign direct investment (FDI). However, bilateral trade is
likely to pick up some of the financial linkages we intend to capture as there is evidence that trade
is a powerful determinant of bilateral (bank) asset holdings (Aviat and Coeurdacier, 2007). In
addition, through its correlation with FDI, trade may proxy for cross-country bank exposure since
bank lending may follow domestic companies when those set up operations abroad (eg, Goldberg
and Saunders, 1980, 1981; Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996; Yamori, 1998). Aiming to maintain broad
coverage and composition through time, we rely on trade data.
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In this regard, the most interesting result is probably the observation that, given the
event country’s size and initial rating, positive spillovers are larger the smaller the
non-event country relative to the event country (∆Size). The magnitude of the co-
efficient suggests that non-event countries which are half (two-thirds) the size of the
event country experience an additional positive spillover effect of about four (two)
basis points, as compared to non-event countries as large as the event country.14
While the effect appears to be relatively small, its direction is still interesting, in
particular when viewed in conjunction with the fact that, across the whole sample,
larger and more highly rated countries induce smaller spillovers (Models 4 to 7 in
Table 2).15 This would be consistent with a world in which positive spillover effects
matter primarily within a group of small developed and emerging countries but less
so within a group of large, developed countries, and in which the latter have little
impact on the former. The insignificance of the absolute difference in trend GDP
growth rates between event and non-event countries (∆TrendGrowth) as a further
measure of differences in economic development does nothing to contradict this in-
terpretation. In view of the generally more ambiguous results for upgrades, however,
we do not wish to overemphasise this point.
4.3 Discussion
Our results can be condensed into the following stylised facts. First, there is strong
evidence of statistically significant, negative spillover effects of downgrade announce-
ments. This result proves highly robust to controlling for anticipation through
watchlistings and the clustering of rating announcements. Second, negative spillover
effects are more pronounced among countries in a common region, which cannot
be explained by measurable fundamental links and similarities between countries.
Third, reactions to upgrades are, if anything, much more muted than for down-
grades, suggesting important asymmetries in the sovereign bond market’s treatment
of the two types of announcements. Fourth, evidence on the channels behind pos-
14∆Size is defined as the difference between the event and non-event country’s log GDPs or,
equivalently, the log of the ratio of the two GDP levels. Therefore, a decrease in relative non-event
country size by half (two-thirds) amounts to an increase in ∆Size of about one hundred (fifty) per
cent. With an absolute coefficient of roughly 0.04, the (semi-elasticity) marginal effects therefore
obtain as four and two basis points, respectively.
15Larger countries tend to hold more favourable credit ratings. This correlation may explain
why, in Models 4 and 5, we find InitRat significant and SizeEvt insignificant, and vice versa for
Models 6 and 7.
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itive spillover effects, if any, offers a more complex picture and appears relatively
inconclusive.
So, which conclusion to draw from this? To begin with, there is a strong case for the
notion that negative sovereign rating announcements, ie those of most concern to
policymakers, do matter in inducing spillovers across markets. Such is the outcome
of the explicit identification strategy used in this paper, which demonstrates that,
all other things equal, “large” downgrades of two notches or more cause larger
hikes in spreads than “small” one-notch downgrades. This suggests a role for CRAs
and their actions in sovereign bond markets, be it through the revelation of new
information on creditworthiness which acts as a “wake-up call” for investors to
reassess fundamentals in other countries (Goldstein, 1998), or simply by providing a
coordinating signal that shifts expectations from a good to a bad equilibrium (Boot
et al., 2006; Masson, 1998).
However, a major regulatory focus on the activities of CRAs would also require
negative spillover effects of substantial economic magnitude. In this paper, we find
the incremental impact of “large” downgrades to be a little over two basis points,
which may appear limited at first glance. Yet, it is important to note that this does
not represent the total effect that policymakers would be concerned about. This
can be thought of as consisting of a “base effect” that “small” downgrades have,
compared to a benchmark scenario of no downgrades anywhere, plus an additional
impact for “large” downgrades — which is what we measure. Of course, the reason
we focus on the latter lies in the impossibility of cleanly identifying the “base effects”
of rating changes unless one rules out the existence of rating-induced spillovers from
the beginning (see the discussion in 3.1). Nonetheless, the total effect is conceivably
a multiple of the one we estimate. At factors of 2 and 5, for instance, the implied
total effects amount to approximately 4 and 10 basis points, respectively. To put
this into perspective, the average sovereign bond spread vis-a`-vis US Treasuries at
the time of the downgrade announcements in our sample is 3.25 per cent, or 325
basis points. While the total effect of downgrades is relatively small in comparison,
one has to bear in mind that governments often need to refinance large amounts
of debt, which magnifies the impact of even small spread differences. Moreover,
there is still a regional effect of up to 4 basis points on top of that, suggesting that
concerns about negative spillovers in the sovereign debt market should not be lightly
dismissed.
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Finally, from a policymaker’s point of view, the finding that the increased strength of
negative spillovers within regions cannot be explained away by measurable linkages
and similarities between countries might also be a cause for concern. Even though
limited data availability precludes an all-encompassing analysis of potential chan-
nels, there is little to suggest that one can comfortably rule out that some countries
are found “guilty by association” with the event country. Moreover, such behaviour
on the part of investors would likely extend to their reactions to news other than
rating announcements. While it is hard to see an obvious remedy, the potential
problem would seem to be much more general and, above all, rooted in investor
behaviour. Hence, it is not clear that putting the primary emphasis on CRAs would
prove effective in this regard.
5 Conclusion
Concerns about negative spillovers across sovereign debt markets in the wake of
sovereign rating changes have recently resurfaced on the agenda of policymakers. In
this paper, we study the existence and potential channels of such spillover effects.
More specifically, we avail of an extensive dataset which covers all sovereign rating
announcements made by the three major agencies and daily sovereign bond market
movements of up to 73 developed and emerging countries between 1994 and 2011.
Based on this, we propose an explicit counterfactual identification strategy which
compares the bond market reactions to small changes in an agency’s assessment of
a country’s creditworthiness to those induced by all other, more major revisions. In
doing so, we account for a number of factors that might impact on the reception of
individual announcements.
We find strong evidence in favour of negative cross-border spillovers in the wake of
sovereign downgrades. At the same time, there is no similarly robust indication as to
positive spillovers since reactions to upgrades are much more muted at best, which
points to an important asymmetry in the sovereign debt market’s treatment of pos-
itive and negative information. Regarding the channels of negative spillover effects,
our results suggest that those are more pronounced for countries within the same
region. Strikingly, however, this cannot be explained by (measurable) fundamental
linkages and similarities, such as trade, which turn out to be insignificant.
Therefore, there is reason to believe that policymakers’ concerns about negative
spillover effects are not unfounded. In fact, failure to reject the irrelevance of a set
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of fundamentals in explaining the added regional component may reinforce, or give
rise to, concerns about the ability of investors to discriminate accurately between
sovereigns. This could also be of more general interest because such behaviour is
likely to carry over to reactions to various kinds of non-CRA news in other markets
and sectors, too. Hence, important though they are, a sole focus on CRAs and their
actions might be missing a bigger picture.
28
References
Afonso, A., D. Furceri, and P. Gomes (2011): “Sovereign credit ratings and
financial markets linkages: applications to European data,” Working Paper No.
1347, European Central Bank.
Alsakka, R. and O. ap Gwilym (2012): “Foreign exchange market reactions to
sovereign credit news,” Journal of International Money and Finance, 31, 845–864.
Altman, E. I. and H. A. Rijken (2004): “How Rating Agencies Achieve Rating
Stability,” Journal of Banking & Finance, 28, 2679–2714.
——— (2006): “The Added Value of Rating Outlooks and Rating Reviews to Cor-
porate Bond Ratings,” Working Paper, NYU Salomon Center.
Arezki, R., B. Candelon, and A. N. R. Sy (2011): “Sovereign Rating News
and Financial Markets Spillovers: Evidence from the European Debt Crisis,” IMF
Working Paper Series 11/68.
Association for Financial Professionals (2002): “Rating Agencies Survey:
Accuracy, Timeliness, and Regulation,” November.
Aviat, A. and N. Coeurdacier (2007): “The geography of trade in goods and
asset holdings,” Journal of International Economics, 71, 22–51.
Baker, H. K. and S. A. Mansi (2002): “Assessing Credit Rating Agencies,”
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 29, 1367–1398.
Boot, A. W. A., T. A. Milbourn, and A. Schmeits (2006): “Credit Ratings
as Coordination Mechanisms,” Review of Financial Studies, 19, 81–118.
Brealey, R. A. and E. C. Kaplanis (1996): “The determination of foreign
banking location,” Journal of International Money and Finance, 15, 577–597.
Brooks, R., R. W. Faff, D. Hillier, and J. Hillier (2004): “The national
market impact of sovereign rating changes,” Journal of Banking & Finance, 28,
233–250.
Cantor, R. (2001): “Moody’s investors service response to the consultative paper
issued by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision ”A new capital adequacy
framework”,” Journal of Banking & Finance, 25, 171–185.
29
Cantor, R. and C. Mann (2003): “Measuring the Performance of Corporate
Bond Ratings,” Special comment, Moody’s Investors Service, New York.
——— (2007): “Analyzing the Tradeoff between Ratings Accuracy and Stability,”
Journal of Fixed Income, 16, 60–68.
Cantor, R. and F. Packer (1996): “Determinants and impact of sovereign credit
ratings,” Economic Policy Review, 37–53.
Christopher, R., S.-J. Kim, and E. Wu (2012): “Do sovereign credit ratings
influence regional stock and bond market interdependencies in emerging coun-
tries?” Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 22,
1070–1089.
De Santis, R. A. (2012): “The euro area sovereign debt crisis: safe haven, credit
rating agencies and the spread of the fever from Greece, Ireland and Portugal,”
Working Paper No. 1419, European Central Bank.
Ferreira, M. A. and P. M. Gama (2007): “Does sovereign debt ratings news
spill over to international stock markets?” Journal of Banking & Finance, 31,
3162–3182.
Financial Times (2010): “German MPs claim Greece needs e120bn,” 28 April
2010.
——— (2011): “Rating agencies face shake-up,” 21 October 2011.
Gande, A. and D. C. Parsley (2005): “News spillovers in the sovereign debt
market,” Journal of Financial Economics, 75, 691–734.
Garc´ıa-Herrero, A. and A. Ort´ız (2006): “The Role of Global Risk Aversion
in Explaining Sovereign Spreads,” Economı´a, 7, 125–155.
Goh, J. C. and L. H. Ederington (1993): “Is a Bond Rating Downgrade Bad
News, Good News, or No News for Stockholders?” Journal of Finance, 48, 2001–
2008.
Goldberg, L. G. and A. Saunders (1980): “The Causes of U.S. Bank Ex-
pansion Overseas: The Case of Great Britain,” Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking, 12, 630–643.
30
——— (1981): “The determinants of foreign banking activity in the United States,”
Journal of Banking & Finance, 5, 17–32.
Goldstein, M. (1998): The Asian Crisis: Causes, Cures, and Systemic Implica-
tions, Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
Gonza´lez-Rozada, M. and E. Levy Yeyati (2008): “Global Factors and
Emerging Market Spreads,” The Economic Journal, 118, 1917–1936.
Hand, J. R. M., R. W. Holthausen, and R. W. Leftwich (1992): “The Ef-
fect of Bond Rating Agency Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices,” Journal
of Finance, 47, 733–752.
Hill, P. and R. Faff (2010): “The Market Impact of Relative Agency Activity
in the Sovereign Ratings Market,” Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 37,
1309–1347.
Holthausen, R. W. and R. W. Leftwich (1986): “The Effect of Bond Rating
Changes on Common Stock Prices,” Journal of Financial Economics, 62, 57–89.
Hooper, V., T. Hume, and S.-J. Kim (2008): “Sovereign rating changes–Do
they provide new information for stock markets?” Economic Systems, 32, 142–
166.
International Monetary Fund (2004): Global Financial Stability Report,
September 2004, chap. Global Financial Market Developments, 8–80.
——— (2006): Global Financial Stability Report, September 2006, chap. Assessing
Global Financial Risks, 1–45.
——— (2010): Global Financial Stability Report, October 2010, chap. The Uses and
Abuses of Sovereign Credit Ratings, 85–122.
Ismailescu, I. and H. Kazemi (2010): “The reaction of emerging market credit
default swap spreads to sovereign credit rating changes,” Journal of Banking &
Finance, 34, 2861–2873.
JP Morgan (1999): “Introducing the J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index
Global (EMBI Global),” August.
31
Kaminsky, G. and S. L. Schmukler (2002): “Emerging Markets Instability:
Do Sovereign Ratings Affect Country Risk and Stock Returns?” World Bank
Economic Review, 16, 171–195.
Kaminsky, G. L. and S. L. Schmukler (1999): “What Triggers Market Jitters?
- A Chronicle of the Asian Crisis,” Journal of International Money and Finance,
18, 537–60.
Larra´ın, G., H. Reisen, and J. von Maltzan (1997): “Emerging Market Risk
and Sovereign Credit Ratings,” OECD Development Centre Working Papers 124,
OECD Publishing.
Liu, P., J. S. Jones, and J. Y. Gu (2011): “Do Credit Rating Agencies Sacrifice
Timeliness by Pursuing Rating Stability? Evidence from Equity Market Reactions
to CreditWatch Events,” Paper presented at the 2011 EFMA Annual Meeting,
Braga (Portugal).
Lo¨ffler, G. (2005): “Avoiding the Rating Bounce: Why Rating Agencies are Slow
to React to New Information,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
56, 365–381.
MacKinlay, A. C. (1997): “Event Studies in Economics and Finance,” Journal
of Economic Literature, 35, 13–39.
Masson, P. (1998): “Contagion: Monsoonal Effects, Spillovers, and Jumps Be-
tween Multiple Equilibria,” IMF Working Paper Series 98/142.
Norden, L. and M. Weber (2004): “Informational Efficiency of Credit Default
Swap and Stock Markets: The Impact of Credit Rating Announcements,” Journal
of Banking & Finance, 28, 2813–2843.
Reisen, H. and J. von Maltzan (1999): “Boom and Bust in Sovereign Ratings,”
International Finance, 2, 273–293.
Standard & Poor’s (2010): “Methodology: Credit Stability Criteria,” Standard
& Poor’s RatingsDirect.
Steiner, M. and V. G. Heinke (2001): “Event Study Concerning International
Bond Price Effects of Credit Rating Actions,” International Journal of Finance
and Economics, 6, 139–157.
32
Sy, A. (2004): “Rating the rating agencies: Anticipating currency crises or debt
crises?” Journal of Banking & Finance, 28, 2845–2867.
Wall Street Journal (2012): “Moody’s Poised to Decide on Spain,” 28 Septem-
ber 2012.
Yamori, N. (1998): “A note on the location choice of multinational banks: The case
of Japanese financial institutions,” Journal of Banking & Finance, 22, 109–120.
33
Appendix
34
Table A.1: Sovereign bond yield data sources and availability
Bloomberg (33 countries)
1994 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom, United States (January), Switzerland (Febru-
ary)
1997 Portugal (February), Greece (July)
1998 Hong Kong (March), Singapore (June), India (November)
1999 Taiwan (April)
2000 Thailand (January), Czech Republic (April), South Korea (December)
2002 Slovakia (June), Romania (August)
2006 Israel (February)
2007 Slovenia (March)
2008 Iceland (April)
JP Morgan EMBI Global (41 countries)
1994 Argentina, Mexico, Nigeria, Venezuela (January), China (March), Brazil
(April), Bulgaria (July), Poland (October), South Africa (December)
1995 Ecuador (February)
1996 Turkey (June), Panama (July), Croatia (August), Malaysia (October)
1997 Colombia (February), Peru (March), Philippines, Russia (December)
1998 Lebanon (April)
1999 Hungary (January), Chile (May)
2000 Ukraine (May)
2001 Pakistan (January), Uruguay (May), Egypt (July), Dominican Republic
(November)
2002 El Salvador (April)
2004 Indonesia (May)
2005 Serbia (July), Vietnam (November)
2007 Belize (March), Kazakhstan (June), Ghana, Jamaica (October), Sri Lanka
(November), Gabon (December)
2008 Georgia (June)
2011 Jordan (January), Senegal (May), Lithuania, Namibia (November)
Notes — This table lists the sources of the sovereign bond yield data in the sample and the years in which the
respective time series are first observed (months in parentheses). If there are gaps in the Bloomberg 10-year generic
yield series, we add observations of 10-year generic yields from Datastream, ensuring that this does not induce
structural breaks. Moreover, for some emerging countries we include 10-year generic yields until the EMBI Global
series become available.
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Table A.2: Rating scales and transformation
Characterisation of debt
and issuer
Letter rating Linear
transformation
S&P Moody’s Fitch
Highest quality
In
ve
st
m
en
t
gr
ad
e
AAA Aaa AAA 17
High quality
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 16
AAA Aa2 AA 15
AA– Aa3 AA– 14
Strong payment capacity
A+ A1 A+ 13
A A2 A 12
A– A3 A– 11
Adequate payment
capacity
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 10
BBB Baa2 BBB 9
BBB– Baa3 BBB– 8
Likely to fulfil obligations,
ongoing uncertainty
S
p
ec
u
la
ti
ve
gr
ad
e
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 7
BB Ba2 BB 6
BB– Ba3 BB– 5
High credit risk
B+ B1 B+ 4
B B2 B 3
B– B3 B– 2
Very high credit risk
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+
CCC Caa2 CCC
CCC– Caa3 CCC–
Near default with
possibility of recovery
CC Ca CC 1
C
Default
SD C DDD
D DD
D
Notes — This table shows how the letter ratings used by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch correspond to one another and
to different degrees of credit risk, and how they are mapped into the linear 17-notch scale used in the investigation.
The transformation is the same as in Afonso et al. (2011), from which this table is adapted.
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Table A.5: Spillover channels, downgrades — Different trade measures
Trade measure
ExpImpEvt TradeImpEvt ExpShEvt TradeShEvt
LARGE 0.0229*** 0.0231*** 0.0229*** 0.0231***
(0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0073)
InitRat -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0023
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
∆InitRat 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
OnWatch 0.0011 0.0010 0.0011 0.0011
(0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0059)
SimActsWdwEvt 0.0139** 0.0143** 0.0139** 0.0143**
(0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068)
SimActsDayNonEvt 0.1137* 0.1131* 0.1138* 0.1131*
(0.0622) (0.0623) (0.0622) (0.0623)
VIX 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Region 0.0332** 0.0308* 0.0330** 0.0309*
(0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0167)
TradeBloc 0.0153 0.0173 0.0151 0.0173
(0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0116)
Trade measure 0.0594 0.0506 0.0259 0.0234
(0.2259) (0.1137) (0.0657) (0.0535)
SizeEvt 0.0260 0.0275 0.0258 0.0275
(0.0313) (0.0316) (0.0312) (0.0315)
∆Size -0.0189 -0.0233 -0.0188 -0.0232
(0.0240) (0.0242) (0.0240) (0.0242)
∆TrendGrowth 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
N 19,896 19,683 19,887 19,674
Event countries 79 79 79 79
Non-event countries 71 71 71 71
Downgrades 405 405 405 405
R2 0.0436 0.0436 0.0436 0.0436
Notes — This table shows the robustness of our results on the spillover channels of downgrade announcements to
different measures of bilateral trade linkages. For purposes of comparison, in the first column we report the results
from the most comprehensive specification using as trade measure ExpImpEvt, the non-event country’s exports to
the event country relative to non-event country GDP (see Model 7 in Table 3). Alternatively, we use TradeImpEvt,
which is bilateral trade (imports + exports) with the event country relative to non-event country GDP. Finally,
ExpShEvt and TradeShEvt measure the event country’s share in the non-event country’s total exports and total
bilateral trade, respectively.
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